The conflict over Nagorno Karabakh, opposing Armenia and Azerbaijan, is the longest conflict in the OSCE area and a fundamental security threat to the South Caucasus and surrounding regions, preventing full and inclusive economic development and constraining regional relations. This chapter takes the ENP as a conflict transformation tool and looks at how the EU has used this initiative to reach civil society organisations (CSOs) and improve their performance as peace-builders in this protracted conflict. Building on the theoretical framework presented by Tocci (2008) , the chapter assesses EU involvement in the civil society domain, mapping the types of organisations privileged by the EU and the potential impact of their activities on the conflict. It puts forward relevant arguments regarding the suitability of the EU's goals and instruments to the dynamics on the ground and concludes with a categorisation of the EU's approach according to three hypotheses: The Liberal Peace, the Leftist Critique and the Realist hypothesis. It is argues that work with civil society is a crucial part of the EU's approach, despite the difficulties of making such engagement a central part of its peace-building and conflict transformation activities.
Introduction
The conflict over Nagorno Karabakh, opposing Armenia and Azerbaijan, is the longest conflict in the OSCE area and a fundamental security threat to the South Caucasus and surrounding regions, preventing full and inclusive economic development and constraining regional relations. The benefits of independence from the Soviet Union have been thwarted by the war and, in the long-term, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh have been unable to fully part-take in the global and regional processes of economic and political development.
External powers acting in the region have managed the existing cease-fire, but have been unable to gather the necessary will and resources to bring about a sustainable and mutually acceptable peace agreement. The presence of the European Union (EU), through the Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) could represent an important incentive for peace.
This chapter takes the ENP as a conflict transformation tool and looks at how the EU has used this initiative to reach civil society organisations (CSOs) and improve their performance as peace-builders in this protracted conflict. Building on the theoretical framework presented by Tocci (2008) , the chapter assesses EU involvement in the civil society domain, mapping the types of organisations privileged by the EU and the potential impact of their activities on the conflict. It puts forward relevant arguments regarding the suitability of the EU's goals and instruments to the dynamics on the ground and concludes with a categorisation of the EU's approach according to three hypotheses: the Liberal Peace, which contends that EU policies aim to increase the interconnectedness between government structures and mid and top level CSOs, on the one hand, and between these CSOs and grassroots, on the other (Tocci 2008, 27) ; the Leftist Critique assumes that EU actions have a detrimental impact on CSOs role in conflict transformation, since EU engagement fundamentally alters the nature of the CSOs, depoliticising or co-opting them (Tocci 2008, 28-30) ; and finally the Realist hypothesis, which sees conflict resolution as mainly a prerogative of state actors and top levels of society and therefore, advocates that in order for the EU to affect conflict dynamics it should focus on these actors (Tocci 2008, 31) .
Although conflict resolution in Eurasia has gradually become a priority for the EU and its member states (Popescu 2007; Stewart 2008) , the Nagorno Karabakh conflict rose to the top of the EU's agenda only after the war in South Ossetia, in 2008. Moreover, the gradual improvement of Armenian-Turkish relations has also opened a window of opportunity for emanates from the emotional attachment of individuals to a group. This emotional attachment can also be projected through a sense of belonging to a territory, thus linking identity with territory". As we will see below, the disputed conceptions of the historical presence of an ethnic group or the other in Karabakh lands remain at the heart of the conflict today. However, in order to account for the years of peaceful co-existence between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, it might be useful to retain a notion of 'ethnicised conflict' (Özkan 2008, 580) , where the violent collapse of the structures of the Soviet Union and the consequent competition for power among elites led to an ethnic-based process of national consolidation.
The dynamics sustaining this protracted conflict, as opposed to the often conveyed notion of "frozen", are complex and range from individual-based to social, regional and global dynamics and evolve perceptions and power balances. The following sections put forward detailed information on these dynamics, in order to recognise the need to address them in a comprehensive view of the conflict.
Addressing Mutual Perceptions
Historical accounts of the Armenian and Azerbaijani presence in Karabakh have been used to justify each side's claim to the land (de Waal 2003, 145-158; ICG 2005, 3-6) . From an early age, children are taught in school and by their families all the important dates in the development of their nation-states and the centrality of Karabakh on both accounts is a crucial factor (Veselý 2008 ). This shapes their ideas of the past and of the future in radically opposed and mutually excluding ways. Moreover, claims to the land have been advanced in historical terms more than political or economic (Milanova 2008, 4) , leaving little room for innovative assessments of interests. The well established victor (Armenians) and victim (Azerbaijanis)
identities have also made it harder to shift perceptions and establish points of departure for reconciliation.
The military outcome of the conflict has also embodied important meanings for the process of nation-building in the three territories. For Armenians, the military victory over
Azerbaijan allowed a heroic reassessment of a national history filled with episodes of defeat, loss of territory and statehood, of a victim mentality that the genocide issue reinforced. 6 It returned self-confidence and pride to Armenians all over the world and strengthened the 6 Armenians are engaged in an international campaign for the recognition of the mass killings by the Ottoman Turks, in 1915, as an act of genocide.
national movement to restore Armenian statehood, after independence. 7 For the NKR, the military victory represented closure in a long history of autonomy, kept through several occupations, that is now very close to being consolidated. 8 Finally for Azerbaijan, it remains an obstacle in the process of developing a nationhood that is fairly recent, while posing a serious threat to its territorial integrity (Priego Moreno 2005) .
Thomas de Waal (2009) speaks of a "Karabakh trap" in which these deep settle identities become harder to renegotiate by the political leaders, since they become part of the societies' self-image. Overcoming the zero-sum mentality, in which Armenian gains are Azerbaijani losses and vice-versa and focusing instead on long-term gains for all sides, including other regional actors that could act as peace-builders is crucial. CSOs working at the mid-level of society could have a real impact by promoting, supporting and diffusing examples of positive cooperation in economic, environmental and social areas. Moreover, linking CSOs dialogue and mediation activities to tangible peace-dividends is also a way to reinforce the impact of their actions (Mirimanova 2009, 25) .
The role of the media is a fundamental aspect in the formation of local perceptions. In the post-cease fire period, the media in both countries normalised its activity. This meant that, in Armenia, interest in the conflict diminished, reflecting the generalised belief that the war was over, while in Azerbaijan war propaganda made its way into the mainstream (Griporyan and Rzayev 2005) . Today, the scenario has changed, with the media increasingly under state control in both countries. In Azerbaijan, state propaganda has been regarded as a legitimate instrument in the war-effort and has trickled down to the society, at times adding elements of xenophobia to the militarist rhetoric. Armenians have been particularly concerned about antiArmenian discourses, which they perceive as being sponsored at the highest level by in Defence of the Liberated Territories, whose leader Jarayir Sefilyan was also a commander for the special Shusha battalion (Abasov and Khachatrian 2006, 82 
Political Dynamics
The current 'no-war no-peace' situation has been appropriated by local and external actors, looking to derive benefits from it. Instead of dealing with the situation, elites have avoided the issue of concessions and compromises to maximise their hold on power, while external actors have come to see the conflict as "frozen" and therefore representing minimal danger to their interests (Özkan 2008, 577) . By portraying conflict dynamics and the incentive structure as "frozen", all parts to the conflict and the international mediators have preserved the current status quo and have downplayed the fragility of the current cease-fire, as well as the dynamic nature of the conflict structure. At best, the only "frozen" aspect of this conflict is the peace process, and even that is radically changing. economic development hard and highly dependent an external assistance, namely from Russia and the Armenian Diaspora. Such economic dependence has also carried a political price, to the extent that policy-making in Armenia has often been influenced by external interests, including from Karabakh, something that has worked as an obstacle to domestic pluralism.
Both the opposition and the government have used the Nagorno Karabakh conflict for domestic political purposes more than they have attempted to reach a solution and in all, the presence of the conflict is usually presented as the main obstacle to democracy (International Crisis Group 2007, 15) .
In Azerbaijan, the tendency to consolidate authoritarian power in the hands of the President and the surrounding elites has been driven both by the conflict and the oil revenues (Vorrath, et al 2007 , Guliyev 2009 A similar narrative can be made in NKR, despite attempts by local political and civil society leaders to portray the regime as more democratic than in Azerbaijan or even in
Armenia. The limitations of non-recognition bear on the pluralism of ideas in these nonrecognised entities (Lynch 2004, 42-54) . Civil society engagement with the EU in the framework of the ENP has mainly been conceived as a way of democratising and making governments more accountable. The process of negotiation of the Action Plans was seen as an opportunity for governments to consult with civil society actors, empowering them, while the monitoring of implementation of the Action Plans should further reinforce this process. However, the outcomes in Armenia and Azerbaijan were below the expectations, with CSOs marginalised by government officials, something the EU did not manage to prevent (Alieva 2006, 10-11) . The EU did set up a feedback mechanism for CSOs from the partner countries to contribute to the annual ENP Action Plan implementation report, and further engagement will be sought during the negotiation of Association Agreements under the Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative (see further details below).
Financial Instruments
Although the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) makes clear reference to CSOs, not only as potential beneficiaries of EU funding, but also as partners in strategic planning and programming of EU external assistance, clear mechanisms and concrete measures on how to implement this participation are still missing (Ljubljana Declaration 2008).
Funding under the ENPI is divided between National and Regional Programmes, managed by the European Commission delegations on the ground and EuporeAid, in Brussels, respectively.
The delegations manage smaller projects, namely the calls for the EIDHR and other financial instruments dealing with civil society (see below for more details).
Since the ENP is in place, the EU has made more vocal statements on the importance of Karabakh conflict, but this seems to be more of token gesture that an important element in engaging the EU in conflict resolution. Under the long-term component, one of the priorities is to enhance pre-and post-crisis preparedness, including investing in implementation partners such as international, regional and sub-regional organisations, state and non-state actors. This could be put into action once an agreement has been reached.
There are also procedural issues currently obstructing a more streamline used of the IfS assistance, which runs through calls for projects. This means that the European Commission does not control the themes or quality of projects being proposed and depends on the organisations applying for funding to put forward conflict-related themes. Overall, EU action on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict has remained very dependent on the stimuli emerging from the ground, and although IfS does not require the formal agreement of states to be implemented, the EU seeks agreement before deploying these measures. A large part of the European presence in both Armenia and Azerbaijan still relies on the member states' national development agencies. This hampers coherence. However, since 2008, and responding to both countries' wish to have relations with the EU upgraded, the European Commission opened two full-fledged delegations in Yerevan and Baku. This move also made it easier for the EU to identify local partners within civil society, making the EU more aware of the circumstances in which CSOs operate, their limitations and their efforts to become active players in conflict prevention and conflict resolution. European Commission delegations are central instruments in the design and implementation of EU assistance and in its diplomatic efforts to sustain assistance with political will. They would be privileged interlocutors in the implementation of any CBMs that might be approved. Because both delegations are rather young and understaffed and their representatives are still in the process of gaining access to and the trust of domestic interlocutors, they have still to gain full operational capacity.
Regional initiatives
In Under the recently created Eastern Partnership (EaP) the EU has the potential to engage further with civil society. The EaP envisions a closer cooperation at the bilateral level between the EU and partners countries, providing the possibility of further reforms. According to EU officials, the EaP seeks to provide a new impetus to multilateral initiatives, which the EU hopes can contribute to regional cooperation and confidence-building in its Eastern neighbourhood. Azerbaijan has refrained from participation in most of the regional initiatives involving Armenia; however, there are signs that the Azerbaijani leadership might also be concerned with its international image as a blocking force and could be more willing to engage. Should the EU move forward with the implementation of CBMs in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, civil society organisations could act under this multilateral initiative, under regional priority number 1, democracy promotion and stability. 
Conflict prevention and crisis management
The EU has also focused increasingly on conflict prevention, following the Gotenburg report (European Council 2001) . The programme envisioned an integrated approach to conflict prevention, working both on the structural causes of violence, including through the strengthening of democracy and human rights situations world-wide, using the EIDHR and the ENP Action Plans (Council of the European Union 2006) and operational prevention, through the development of the EU civilian crisis management, ESDP missions, and cooperation with international partners such as the UN, the OSCE and other regional intergovernmental bodies.
Civil society engagement was underscored as an important contribution to conflict prevention, especially in early warning, although co-operation throughout all the conflict phases was deemed crucial. However, work is needed to mainstream conflict prevention and increase dialogue promotion between governments and their societies, as part of the EU's governance 26 Interview with EU officials at EuropeAid Co-operation office, May 3, 2009, Brussels. approaches to conflict (EPLO 2006, 38) . Moreover, EU instruments for crisis management and early warning can also be deployed as support tools for the ongoing mediation process, in that they can improve the EU's contribution to making international guarantees to the conflict parties more credible (Herrberg et al 2009, 18) . This is particularly relevant as the peace process around Nagorno Karabakh has reached a critical stage, where international mediation must push through concrete commitments by the conflict parties (Sarkisyan 2009 ).
The 
Overview
EU engagement in the Nagorno Karabakh peace process has increased over the last years, mainly through the institutionalisation of an informal mediation role, partly derived from
France's presence in the official mediation process, acting as a Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk
Group, but also from other EU member states' participation in the group's enlarged format. power-based mediation, and favour the development of a wider reconciliation process among and within societies (Gahramanova 2007, 46 Energy security is a central priority for both the Commission and the member states, limiting their options of engagement and making political stability a central concern for investors.
Member states also have their own interests, policies and programmes in Azerbaijan and often they leave EU policies for second plan.
Civil society working on conflict resolution in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno

Karabakh
Below there is a list of CSOs interviewed, from mid and grassroots level in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh. 
Armenia Azerbaijan Nagorno Karabakh
Types of Activities
During the 1990s, following the cease-fire, local CSOs in Armenia and Azerbaijan got engaged in activities related to conflict resolution, often with support from international
donors. An explicit feature of these activities was to cultivate dialogue between the parties to the conflict, including inside Nagorno Karabakh. This facilitated the development of CSOs across the region, with prominent examples such as the Yerevan, Baku and Stepanakert Press Clubs, the first independent media groups to emerge after the collapse of the USSR. Another well-known organisation present in the region is the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly (HCA) with branches in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Karabakh. Both the Press Clubs and the HCA work as umbrella organisations, providing support for grassroots organisations, looking to strengthen independent voices in the region and to contribute to the pacification and free development of regional societies, including though contributions to conflict resolution. They were engaged in peace caravans, journalists' meetings, surveys and track-two mediation efforts, among other activities (Hasanov and Ishkanian 2005) .
However, the lack of results at the political level deteriorated the context in which CSOs could contribute to conflict transformation and conflict resolution. The consolidation of the status quo has led, in Armenia, to a tendency to regard the conflict over Karabakh as de facto settled. The Armenian government policy regarding civil society engagement in conflict resolution has shifted from a strictly elite-dominated process, to regard civil society engagement as useful, at best, and harmless, at worst. This could lead most CSOs to divert their priorities to development-based activities. However, this trend is counterbalanced by the fact that it is easier for CSOs to work on conflict resolution issues in Armenia. In Azerbaijan, often one organisation will combine activities on democracy promotion and human rights education with peaceful conflict transformation, reflecting an adaptation to the increasingly dangerous situation for peace activists, and for those CSOs dealing with highly politicised
issues (Human Rights Center of Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan National Committee of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights 2004). This included running the risk of
being physically endangered or subverting the role of civil society exclusively for conflict resolution purposes, when there was mounting evidence that both sides (Armenia and Azerbaijan) were using civil society in their nationalist propaganda. One way to circumvent this situation has been to resort to human rights reports as vehicles to expose violent conflictrelated action and to advocate non-violence (Weiss and Nazarenko 1997, 8 Inside Nagorno Karabakh conflict resolution remains a priority. This is natural for a society aiming to live a fully recognised existence and to overcome the limitations of the current context, which makes them highly dependent on external funding and on foreign donors' priorities. CSOs also display a tendency to be less specialised in their activities, Holding activities "affect the material and psychological symptoms of conflict rather than its underlying causes" (Tocci 2008, 18) , affecting long-term conflict dynamics. Such activities include those looking to address the symptoms of economic isolation of Armenia, which Azerbaijan perceives as a central strategy in the conflict. Much like in Nagorno Karabakh, the argument should be made that this strategy of isolation has been ineffective in pushing Armenia to concede its position and has strengthened radical groups in the country, as fundamental premise for any peace agreement to be regarded as legitimate and to be accepted by the population. This is particularly important to assure that the return of refugees can be made in a context of stability, where the main sources of tension and grievances have been addressed. In this context, CSOs from Nagorno Karabakh have voiced their critics to the approach of the Minsk Group and its attempt to impose the Madrid principles on Nagorno Karabakh without taking their views into consideration. Recognising these obstacles the Minsk
Group has widened its activities to include people from NKR, both from civil society and the administration. organisations for grants from foreign governments. Their local partners also suffer due to the lack the resources to keep supporting smaller grassroots organisations. 59 There is also an added difficulty in getting donors engaged in the promotion of long-term projects aimed at conflict transformation, as opposed to conflict resolution, since results are not immediate. Moreover, the priority of international donors, including the EU, seems to have shifted towards democracy and human rights, and away from conflict-related activities. CSOs in Nagorno
Karabakh are highly dependent on international actors to provide in-put to the peace process.
The need to build trust, common knowledge and develop the opportunities for increased positive contact between the Azerbaijani and Karabakhi societies is particularly important to assure that the return of refugees can be made in a context of stability, where the main sources of tension and grievances have been addressed.
However, dependence of external funding can also marginalise CSOs and portray them as co-opted and, in extreme cases, as traitors, especially when the society is polarised.
Impositions in terms of agenda by foreign donors, pushing for reconciliation and dialogue has left local CSOs in fragile security conditions and has alienated them from the wider public. In other cases, the lack of funds has limited the scope of action undertaken by local CSOs. 60 One central issue mentioned in the interviews was donors' priorities for regional formats (including Georgia or Turkey) as opposed to bilateral (Armenian-Azerbaijani) ones. 61 Although this has allowed for more projects to be developed, as they usually are not opposed by any of the parts and participants feel more comfortable in these diluted formats, bilateral meetings have the potential to be more intensive and deal with hard issues in more depth, potentially reaching more sustainable and visible results in conflict-related issues. Similarly, Diaspora funding also brings a nationalistic agenda close to governmental priorities. 62 Diversification of sources would facilitate the development of CSOs working on conflict-related activities, but also human rights and democratisation, or addressing specific problems such as refugee issues. 
EU impact
The EU has financed NGOs in Armenia since 2004, though none of the projects is directly aimed at peace-building. 64 The EIDHR has also been available to Armenian CSOs The EUSR met at the time with NKR representatives in Armenia, while his Political Advisors travelled to Stepanakert/ Khankendi and met both with the political leadership and civil society. Although there has been no continuation of these contacts with civil society and the visit of the EUSR has not taken place yet, it was an important step to balance the EU's conflict resolution policies in the region, too centred on Georgia.
There has been another project financed under the ENPI regional projects, run by two experts promoting meetings between representatives from the two countries and from NKR.
The project run as a track-two diplomacy initiative with three stages: in the first stage, experts from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh and Turkey met, in four seminars, to discuss consequences of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict; in the second stage a bilateral meeting (the first in ten years) between officials from the Republic of Azerbaijan and of the NKR, followed by debriefings in Yerevan, Stepanakert/ Khankendi and Baku was envisioned. This initiative was closely monitored and sponsored by DG Relex and the EUSR for the South Caucasus, and 65 The EUSR had reached an agreement with the Azerbaijani Foreign Minister to visit NKR after the meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents, in St. Petersburg. However, in a last minute volte face, the Azerbaijani Ambassador in Brussels communicated that the visit was not the best option taking into consideration the lack of progress in the St. Petersburg summit. Interview Council Officials, Brussels, May 2009. focused on CBMs, abstaining from discussing substantive matters under the OSCE Minsk Group. The third stage aimed at facilitating trilateral meetings between Armenia, Azerbaijan and NKR authorities, in Georgia, but major problems prevented the completion of the contract.
In Armenia, the main obstacle to any visible impact of EU actions in the conflict is what many civil society actors call an "imitation of democracy", making structural approaches highly ineffective. On the other hand, under the ENPI, the EU has also been displaying a careful selection of projects and priorities, avoiding the financing of openly critic CSOs or those working on issues that are poorly perceived by the government. This has reduced the spectrum of CSOs to those "hunting" for funds, those CSOs closely linked to the government, and advocacy CSOs. One area where Armenian CSOs are hopeful of EU support is in crossborder regional cooperation, border management and energy cooperation projects, which Armenia sees as confidence-building measures (much as the EU), but which Azerbaijan has refused to participate in. EU's work with Azerbaijani CSOs in conflict resolution needs to become more visible, balancing its government-centred approach by supporting and improving CSOs capacity. This should include not only democracy and human rights CSOs, but also more political and activist ones (which the EU has refused to assist), since they are under great pressure, weakened by official policies and lack of funding.
The EU should also make civil society an active stakeholder in setting the EU's priorities for Azerbaijan, better framing financing to the situation on the ground and consequently empowering CSOs. The general impression is that over the last years, which roughly match the entrance of Azerbaijan to the Council of Europe and in the ENP initiative, conditions for civil society to develop and become a legitimate and empowered social agent have decreased. So we can say that although the EU has an indirect approach to conflict resolution, through a broad human rights approach, it is operating in fast deteriorating environment. Moreover, EU activities in Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus region lack an articulation towards the goal of peace. Among the Karabakhi CSOs EU engagement is mostly welcomed and expectations are high regarding the scope of activities where the EU could get involved (civil society development, mediation, training, financial assistance for democracy and human rights projects and assistance to the refugee community). There are, however, some reservations, also expressed by the NKR representative in Yerevan, regarding EU engagement in conflict resolution. 66 Considering the recognition of Kosovo by most EU member states, and EU engagement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Union is now perceived in Karabakh as applying double standards and thus it will be necessary to develop trust between people in Nagorno Karabakh and the EU before more high profile issues could be approached.
67
The possibility of more EU engagement in conflict resolution, namely in changing the structural conditions around the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, has been facilitated by some level of depolitisation of the context, making the EU more suitable to promote a less geopolitical approach. Most interviewees consider that civil society can only be effective in conflict transformation if there are concrete steps towards a political agreement at the top level. In that sense the EU is well positioned to put pressure on the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan and to increase contacts between the two sides, developing eventually an international confidence-building programme, where trust can be restored and the international community can also improve its stance as security providers once a peace agreement is reached.
Explaining EU activities in the civil society domain
The EU has focused on mid-and top-level CSOs, mainly aiming to develop interlocutors on the ground for its governance policies. In the framework of the ENP, the EU has attempted to raise the status of civil society as an agent in public life, mainly by promoting forms of dialogue between CSOs and government officials. The EU has supported feedback mechanisms for governmental policies to be analysed by civil society and seeks to make civil society an integral part of its monitoring mechanisms, particularly in the context of the EaP initiative. This would fit well into the Liberal Pace Paradigm hypothesis, proposed in the conceptual paper (Tocci 2008) , since the EU has focused on reinforcing the linkages between government structures and mid-level CSOs with access to EU funds and with the dimension and skills to assess public policies and present them to the society at large as well as the international community. The EU has also financed workshops, debates and training, granting mid-level CSOs the opportunity to reach to the grassroots. The EU has also provided other donors with a commonly accepted framework (the ENP Action Plans) which serves as a reference point in their interaction with civil society and governments, reinforcing this liberal perspective. Commission delegations on the ground to manage such programmes is still being fully developed. This leads to a concentration of resources and knowledge in few organisations that is prevents an equal development across civil society. Second, in Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh, the EU is either a new comer or an absent player, limiting the scope of its impact both at the governmental and civil society level. As far as conflict resolution is concerned, the EU has been unable and unwilling to take a more pro-active stance and its engagement has been conditional on several factors, including the priority awarded to the Minsk Group mediation efforts, which are not questioned by any of the sides. The EU also prioritised Georgia in its conflict resolution and conflict transformation efforts in the South Caucasus, leaving civil society actors, which are dealing with the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, in a marginal position. By not instigating the development of conflict-related projects by civil society, the EU has helped to maintain the status quo around the NK conflict, privileging stability. The context has now changed drastically, providing the opportunity for EU engagement, namely with and through civil society.
To a certain extent, then, EU engagement in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict fits the realist critique, which places state actors at the heart of conflict resolution. EU focus on the governmental level, first and foremost, has reinforced the government in Azerbaijan, legitimising it through engagement, while avoiding major contacts with CSOs engaged in denouncing and watch-dog activities. In Armenia, EU presence and co-operation with government has been perceived by civil society actors as a good way to put pressure on the government and has opened the political space for dialogue on conflict. Naturally this has been facilitated by Armenia's position on the conflict and by some level of openness of the Armenian regime that is not visible in Azerbaijan. In Nagorno Karabakh the EUSR has led EU contacts and has dealt both with civil society and political representatives, though sporadically.
We can therefore conclude that the EU does prioritise contacts with state actors and does recognise their importance in solving the conflict, although the official approach reserves an important role for civil society, which the lack of resources and the delicate political and social context of the region have prevented from fully developing. EU impact on civil society has mainly been built through the ENP, including through processes of accountability, increased support and opportunity to develop skills and ideas. So far this approach is missing a direct link to conflict resolution.
There is also the potential for EU actions to develop into the framework envisioned by the leftist critique hypothesis. This perspective sees EU engagement as detrimental to conflict resolution by either leading to the mushrooming of more de-politicised technical CSOs or by over politicising and co-opting CSOs working around the conflict. As we have seen, as far as the EU has managed to have an impact on civil society in Armenia and Azerbaijan, it has privileged less political ones, particularly in Azerbaijan. In Nagorno Karabakh the EU has not deployed the means to have any visible result. The legitimacy of the mid and top-level CSOs with which the EU is working in the framework of the ENP has been maintained, as most of the CSOs in this study remain closely linked to their communities, despite the controversy of supporting contact across the frontline. EU support for civil society development through training, network development and governmental support, has maintained a good level of interconnectedness throughout the society, as envisioned by the Liberal paradigm hypothesis.
However, the EU has to compete with other donors (including the Azerbaijani state and the Armenian Diaspora) for an impact on civil society and conflict resolution, since it remains a relatively complex and new donor in the region. Moreover, inside Nagorno Karabakh the EU is completely absent, and there is a long road ahead before it is regarded as a trust-worthy partner by local CSOs.
